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Many of us would prefer not to think about the issue of how and when we will 
die until we are compelled to do so. Should we turn our minds to such matters, 
understandable fears and emotions quickly can crowd out our higher reasoning 
facilities. But it is not necessary to embrace Plato’s assertion that “those who 
pursue philosophy aright study nothing but dying and being dead”1 in order to 
confront the necessary implications of our mortality: even though we may wish 
to ignore death, it most assuredly will not ignore us. Uncomfortable and 
upsetting as they may be, questions about the ending we might want for our 
particular life story and thus what choices we think ought to be permitted in end 
of life situations are not something that we can or should avoid confronting with 
clear eyes and an open mind. 
 
In fact, debates over such matters — more particularly, whether and when 
persons suffering as the result of an incurable and/or terminal medical condition 
ought to be allowed to end their lives with the active assistance of others — have 
become increasingly common around the world. The laws of six countries 
currently permit such practices,2  as do six states within the United States of 
America.3 Parliaments in both the United Kingdom4 and Scotland5 recently have 
voted down legislative proposals to join this group. In contrast, last year a 
parliamentary committee in the Australian State of Victoria recommended that it 
should adopt such a law,6 with legislation to deliver on that recommendation set 
to enter the State Parliament in 2017. And in New Zealand, the High Court 
determined in Seales v Attorney-General that our criminal law presently prohibits 
a doctor from actively assisting a terminally ill patient to die. 7 Following that 
judgment, the House of Representatives’ Health Committee commenced a wide-
ranging inquiry into “all the various aspects of the issue, including [its] social, 
legal medical, cultural, financial, ethical and philosophical implications”, while a 
Bill in the name of David Seymour MP currently in the members’ ballot proposes 
that our Parliament legislate to allow for such “end of life choice”.8  
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1 Plato “Phaedo” in Plato in Twelve Volumes (William Heinemann, London, 1966) vol 1 at 64a. 
2 Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Switzerland. 
3 California, Colorado, Montana, Oregon, Vermont and Washington. 
4 Assisted Dying (No 2) Bill (2015-16) (UK). 
5 Assisted Suicide (Scotland) Bill 2015. 
6 Legal and Social Issues Committee Inquiry into End of Life Choices: Final Report (Victorian 
Government Printer, Melbourne, 2016).  
7 Seales v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1239, [2015] 3 NZLR 556. 
8 See End of Life Choice Bill 2015. In addition, Louisa Wall has publicised a draft Member’s Bill, 
the Authorised Dying Bill, but has chosen not to submit this to the ballot. See Phil Taylor “Lecretia 




In this article I argue that New Zealand’s law should be amended to allow at 
least those competent and consenting adult persons:  
 
x experiencing unbearable physical or mental suffering;  
x as the result of an incurable and terminal medical condition;  
x where the best medical advice is that death will occur in the next six months;  
 
to directly request that a willing doctor actively help end their life.9 To avoid 
repetition, I will refer to those in such a situation as being “relevant persons”. I 
focus on the case of relevant persons because it provides the strongest grounds 
for the proffered proposition; if anyone should be able to receive such help to 
die, it is they. Conversely, I accept that if the argument fails in respect of such 
relevant persons, then it fails in all other cases as well. The question whether, if 
successful for relevant persons, the argument then ought to apply to other 
classes of person — or, indeed, if it is possible to limit the argument’s reach at all 
— will be addressed in the article’s final part.  
 
There are two reasons for writing this article now. First, as just noted, the issue 
is very much a current issue of public policy in New Zealand. Second, my 
colleague at Otago, Professor Rex Ahdar, recently has published a carefully 
reasoned article arguing that our present law on the issue should not be 
changed. 10  A clear statement of the general argument in favour of this law 
reform is thus doubly warranted. As with Professor Ahdar’s critique, this article 
does not closely describe the particular features of current proposals to allow 
medical help to die in New Zealand; rather, it seeks to establish the general 
principle that some law change should occur to allow it.  
 
I begin in part one with an initial clarification of the various terms used by those 
involved in this debate. Part two outlines the intertwined moral grounds for 
allowing medical help to die — recognition of individual autonomy and avoidance 
of cruelty — and responds to some arguments that these do not justify taking 
such a step. Part three turns to examine current medical practice, arguing that 
there is no good reason to distinguish actively helping a relevant person to die 
from the various end of life choices presently permitted to patients. Part four 
then considers and responds to two of the most common arguments against 
permitting such medical help: that determining who may qualify for it results in 
arbitrary and unprincipled distinctions and that allowing such help will result in a 
“slippery slope” whereby an ever increasing range of individuals will feel 
compelled to request it. I then conclude in part five by arguing that the time for a 
law change is now in that a large proportion of the New Zealand public has 
repeatedly shown that it supports such a reform. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Seales knew exactly what she was asking for: Louisa Wall” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, 
Auckland, 19 November 2016).  
9 I assume and accept that actively helping a patient to die should be a matter of individual 
conscience. Current legislative proposals for allowing aid in dying also do so; see End of Life 
Choice Bill, cl 6; Authorised Dying Bill, cl 10. 
10 Rex Tauati Ahdar “The Case Against Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide” [2016] NZ L Rev 459. 
[2017] New Zealand Criminal Law Review 
5 
 
I. AN INITIAL BRIEF NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY 
 
A preliminary problem when discussing matters of end-of-life choice is that there 
are a number of different practices that may be called different things by those 
taking each side of the debate. Consequently, it is worth clarifying at the outset 
what particular terms refer to. The withdrawal (or withholding) of life-sustaining 
treatment commonly is described as passive euthanasia,11 while the positive act 
of intentionally causing the death of another person on compassionate grounds is 
termed active euthanasia. A further distinction is drawn between voluntary 
euthanasia, where consent first is obtained, and non-voluntary euthanasia, where 
express consent is not acquired, such as where a person is in a persistent 
vegetative state or otherwise lacks the capacity to decide.  
 
The common feature in all such cases is that an external party takes a step that 
directly leads to death, either by consciously choosing to withhold or withdraw 
treatment or deliberately administering a dose of fatal medication or the like. As 
discussed further below, passive voluntary euthanasia is lawful in New Zealand 
whenever a competent person decides upon it. Passive non-voluntary euthanasia 
also is lawful where a doctor believes that further treatment or intervention is not 
in a patient’s best interests. However, active euthanasia is unlawful in all cases, 
amounting to culpable homicide.12 Finally, indirect euthanasia (also called the 
“double effect doctrine”) covers the administration of drugs with the primary 
purpose of relieving a terminally ill patient’s pain and suffering, despite a doctor 
knowing that this treatment likely will have the incidental effect of hastening that 
person’s death.13 This practice is lawful in New Zealand.14 
 
The concept of euthanasia is then very closely related to that of suicide. Suicide 
itself involves an individual actively and directly ending her own life, while 
assisted suicide involves a person taking active steps to aid another individual in 
committing suicide. A specific form of such assistance is physician-assisted 
suicide, which involves a doctor prescribing a lethal substance to a patient 
knowing that they intend later self-administration. In New Zealand, committing 
or attempting suicide is not a criminal offence. However, it is an offence for any 
person to “aid[] or abet[] any person in the commission of suicide”.15 The High 
Court has declared that this provision applies to anyone, whether a health 
professional or otherwise, that supplies even a terminally ill patient with lethal 
                                                          
11 Professor Ahdar denies that such a concept exists, labelling it “misleading and unhelpful” at 
461. I simply will note here that the term is both widely used and defensible; see, e.g., Richard 
Sainsbury “End of life issues” in I M St George (ed) Cole’s medical practice in New Zealand (12th 
ed, Medical Council of New Zealand, Wellington, 2013) 107 at 110; E Garrard and S Wilkinson 
“Passive euthanasia” (2005) 31 J Med Ethics 64. 
12 Airedale NHS Hospital Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 (HL); R v Martin (no 2) HC Wanganui 
CRI-2003-083-432B, 24 March 2004; Seales, above n 7, at [112]–[114]. 
13 E Emanuel “Euthanasia: historical, ethical and empiric perspectives” (1994) 154 Arch Int Med 
1890.  
14 Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235 (HC) at 250–251; Seales, 
above n 7, at [106]. 
15 Crimes Act 1961, s 41(1)(b). 
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medication for the purpose of subsequently ending her own life.16 Indeed, even 
informing a person about how to end one’s own life painlessly is an offence, if 
done knowing and intending that the recipient will act on the information 
supplied.17 
 
Further complicating matters is the fact that the very use of the terms 
“euthanasia” and “suicide” are deeply contested in this context, with the phrase 
“aid in dying” increasingly used in their place. 18  In this parlance, active 
euthanasia is termed assisted aid in dying while physician-assisted suicide is 
called facilitated aid in dying. These descriptors are claimed to be less emotively 
fraught, given the historical connection between the term euthanasia and the 
actions of the Nazi regime (which murdered over 100,000 men, women and 
children who were physically and/or mentally disabled, or otherwise considered 
“genetically inferior”), as well as the psychological differences between those 
who commit suicide and those who seek to end their lives voluntarily to escape 
unbearable suffering.19 I have preferred these latter terms in previous writings on 
this topic.20 If for no other reason than the sake of consistency, I shall do so in 
this article as well. The ultimate question is not what we call the actions in 
question, but whether they ought to be permitted. To that question I now turn. 
 
II. IT IS MORALLY DESIRABLE TO PERMIT AID IN DYING  
 
As intimated above, the current legal status of aid in dying in New Zealand is 
reasonably clear. In Seales v Attorney-General, 21  the High Court refused to 
declare that providing either assisted or facilitated aid in dying is not an offence 
under the Crimes Act 1961 punishable (at least in theory)22 by extremely long 
terms of imprisonment.23 Proponents of aid in dying believe that this current 
state of our criminal law is morally wrong and should be changed to permit a 
willing doctor to give such assistance to (at least) relevant persons. The 
                                                          
16 Seales, above n 7, at [147]. See also R v Davison [2011] NZHC 1677; R v Mott [2012] NZHC 
2366. But see Ahdar, above n 10, at 477. 
17 Crimes Act 1961, s 41(1)(a) and (2). See also R v Tamatea (2003) 20 CRNZ 363 (HC). 
18 See Kathryn Tucker “At the Very End of Life: The Emergence of Policy Supporting Aid in Dying 
Among Mainstream Medical and Health Policy Associations” (2009) 10 Harv Health Pol Rev 45 at 
45. 
19 Gina Lopes Dying with Dignity: A Legal Approach to Assisted Dying (Praeger, Santa Barbara, 
California, 2015) at 10. 
20 Kathryn Tucker and Andrew Geddis “Litigating for the right to die” [2015] NZLJ 172; Andrew 
Geddis and Colin Gavaghan “Aid in dying in New Zealand: Recent legal developments” (2016) 23 
JLM 849. 
21 Seales, above n 7, at [9]. See also Geddis and Gavaghan, above n 20, at 853–857. 
22 In practice, recent sentences for individuals who provide aid in dying have ranged from a 
discharge without conviction to home detention. See, e.g., R v Ruscoe (1992) 8 CRNZ 68 (CA); R 
v Law [2002] 19 CRNZ 500 (HC); R v Faithfull HC Auckland CRI 2007-044-007451, 14 March 
2008; R v Crutchley HC Hamilton CRI 2007-069-83, 9 July 2008; R v KJK HC Christchurch CRI 
2009-009-14397, 18 Feburary 2010; R v Davison HC Dunedin CRI 2010-012-4876, 24 November 
2011; Mott, above n 16. 
23 The sentence for culpable homicide is up to life imprisonment (Crimes Act 1961, s 172(1); s 
177(1)), whilst aiding or abetting suicide attracts a potential sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment 
(Crimes Act 1961, s 179(1)). 
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argument for doing so then rests on two primary propositions.24 First, relevant 
persons ought to be permitted to choose for themselves how and when they will 
die. This claim is derived from notions of individual autonomy: the right of such 
individuals to decide for themselves the time and manner of their life’s end 
demands our collective respect (even if not our agreement). Second, there is no 
good reason for society to deny relevant persons this choice and thereby require 
that they continue to suffer against their will. Laws that prevent relevant persons 
receiving voluntarily provided aid in dying are unnecessarily cruel. And a society 
that denies individuals their autonomy in a way that is unnecessarily cruel is 
morally deficient. Establishing the claim that aid in dying ought to be permitted 
requires both propositions be considered in greater depth. 
 
A. The Argument from Autonomy 
 
The first autonomy-based claim derives from our society’s core liberal 
individualist commitments. We generally presume competent adults to be the 
superior judges of what is best for them in the particular situation they are 
confronted with and so should respect their decisions about what actions they do 
or do not want to take in response. Thus, it is a foundational principle of medical 
practice that informed consent must be obtained for any procedure on or 
treatment of a patient who is capable of giving such consent. 25  Liberal-
individualist presumptions also underpin wider societal decisions as to what 
people are permitted to do. We collectively allow people to climb up mountains 
despite the inevitable numerous fatalities that result,26 accept political protests 
we disagree with at the cost of significant disruption and irritation,27 and even 
tolerate others listening to Creed songs notwithstanding their lack of any musical 
value whatsoever. 28  Indeed, our laws steadily are being reformed to better 
reflect this basic worldview. Not only were homosexual acts decriminalised in 
1986,29 the right of same-sex couples to claim marital status since has been 
affirmed.30  The solicitation of payment for sex has been decriminalised, with 
prostitution now recognised as a lawful profession. 31  Making or publishing a 
statement that expresses a seditious intention is no longer an offence.32 Students 
                                                          
24 See Glanville Williams “Euthanasia Legislation: A Rejoinder to the Non-Religious Objections”, in 
AB Downing (ed) Euthanasia and the Right to Die (Peter Owen, London, 1969) 134 at 134–135; 
Stuart Beresford “Euthanasia, The Right to Die and the Bill of Rights Act” [2005] Hum Rts 
Research 3 at 7. 
25 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) 
Regulations 1996, reg 2, Right 7.  
26 There have been, for example, more than 230 known fatalities in the Aoraki/Mount Cook 
National Park alone, including 78 from climbing Aoraki itself.  
27 Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC 30, [2007] 3 NZLR 91; Morse v Police [2011] NZSC 45, [2012] 2 
NZLR 1. 
28 See “Readers’ Poll: The Top Ten Worst Bands of the Nineties” (9 May 2013) Rolling Stone 
<www.rollingstone.com/music/pictures/readers-poll-the-ten-worst-bands-of-the-nineties-
20130509/1-creed-0736783>. 
29 Homosexual Law Reform Act 1986. 
30 Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment 2013. 
31 Prostitution Reform Act 2003. 
32 Crimes (Repeal of Seditious Offences) Amendment Act 2007. 
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may study at university without having to be a member of a students’ 
association.33 And so on. 
 
Of course, a claim that individual autonomy is a fundamental precept of our 
society does not equate to everybody being allowed to do everything they want. 
Society can and still does impose numerous collective limits on individual choice 
through the criminal law. We do not let people take some kinds of recreational 
drugs.34 We do not let people sell their bodily organs.35 We do not let people 
claim to be entitled to wear medals that they were not properly awarded.36 And 
so on. While acknowledging the factual existence of such wide-ranging 
restrictions on personal liberty, an immediate question is whether they are 
morally defensible. Because pointing to other existing laws that are themselves 
an illegitimate infringement of individual autonomy does not really counter the 
claim that relevant persons should be permitted to receive aid in dying. Doing so 
is like a bank robber who defends his actions by saying he also robs post offices, 
pharmacies and toy stores. Instead, we need to examine the applicability of 
general justifications for society placing collective limits on the individual exercise 
of decisional freedom. There are three such justifications, none of which (I will 
argue in the course of this article) apply to the case of aid in dying. 
 
The first is where we judge an individual’s exercise of autonomy to be vitiated by 
some form of cognitive bias or other reasoning defect, such that her decision 
cannot be trusted to reflect a properly considered understanding of what is best 
for her. In such circumstances, society may decide to impose a paternalistic 
fetter on an individual’s decisional freedom for that individual’s own good. 
However, in an earlier article Professor Ahdar sounded an appropriate note of 
caution about this justification for restraining individual action:37 
 
… the range of situations in which such condescending paternalistic claims hold true (on 
average, over time and allowing for the costs of imposing views on others) is … fairly 
limited. It is not that the notion that I know better than you what will further your welfare 
is always false or indefensible. Rather, the point is that experience indicates that as a rule 
it is usually false. 
 
I will argue in more detail below that the claim actually is false in respect of aid 
in dying, as there simply is no reason for us to assume that collectively we have 
a superior understanding of what are the true best interests of relevant persons. 
We cannot honestly say a person is “foolish” or “short-sighted” or “delusional” for 
wanting to end her life rather than continue a necessarily truncated existence 
marred by pain and suffering. We know this because we already respect such 
individuals’ decision to die. As shall be seen, our law and medical practices treat 
as sacrosanct a competent patient’s decision to end treatment or remove life 
support, even where such a choice results in her inevitable death. So if we see 
                                                          
33 Education (Freedom of Association) Amendment Act 2010. 
34 Misuse of Drugs Act 1975. 
35 Human Tissue Act 2008, s 56. 
36 Military Decorations and Distinctive Badges Act 1918, s 4A. 
37 Rex Ahdar and James Allan “Taking Smacking Seriously: The Case for Retaining the Legality of 
Parental Smacking in New Zealand” [2001] NZ L Rev 1 at 18 (internal citation omitted).  
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no reason to impose paternalistic constraints on these sorts of end-of-life 
decisions, then there is no reason to do so with respect to a relevant person’s 
decision to seek aid in dying. 
 
A second reason for imposing limits on individual autonomy is that its exercise 
may result in harm to others. Most of our criminal law reflects a desire to prevent 
some forms of action immediately and directly impacting negatively on others’ 
interests. Concern about the indirect effect of the exercise of choice on others 
then underpins much of the criminal law’s remaining limits. For example, we 
legislate against some apparently “victimless crimes” in order to undermine a 
market that we believe will result in harm to more vulnerable individuals.38 With 
respect to aid in dying, it is argued that should the practice be permitted for 
relevant persons, it inevitably will result in incompetent or non-consenting 
individuals also being coerced into ending their own lives. Alternatively, a slippery 
slope will develop that leads to its application to an ever-increasing range of 
individuals and situations, inevitably resulting in pressure on the vulnerable to 
avail themselves of the option. I will again argue in more detail below that such 
claims regarding potential harm are both not supported by evidence and at odds 
with current end of life practices. In particular, there is now sufficient experience 
from overseas jurisdictions to counter fears about the inevitability of any 
particular consequences of permitting aid in dying. Furthermore, the very broad 
decisional freedom we already give to individuals at life’s end is inconsistent with 
claims that allowing aid in dying must result in harm to others. Simply put, if 
letting people choose how they will die inexorably leads to the vulnerable being 
pressured to end their lives early, then opponents of aid in dying must explain 
why it is that current forms of passive euthanasia are not routinely abused in 
hospitals, rest homes and hospices. 
 
Finally, there is a somewhat nebulous set of constraints imposed on individual 
freedom of choice out of irreducibly moral judgments regarding the nature of 
certain acts.39 Most pertinently, the Crimes Act 1961, s 63 states: “No one has a 
right to consent to the infliction of death upon himself or herself”. Thus, even a 
fully informed, non-coerced decision to (say) voluntarily offer oneself up for 
human sacrifice to Odin 40  is overridden by society’s collective judgment that 
human life is too valuable for an individual to agree to permit another to take it 
from her. It may thus be argued that the provision of aid in dying is a 
fundamentally wrongful act and our laws should uphold “the sanctity of life” 
absolutely by allowing no exceptions to the bar on actively participating in 
another person’s desire to die.41 At this point we may reach an irreconcilable gulf 
                                                          
38 Examples of this are the prohibition on personal possession of illegal drugs, the selling of bodily 
organs and the viewing of digitally created child pornography. 
39 Such constraints seek to combat what Joel Feinburg describes as “free-floating evils”; see Joel 
Feinberg The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Vol 4: Harmless Wrongdoing (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1990) at 20–25. 
40 See, e.g., “Sacrifice” Vikings (season 1, episode 8).  
41 Ahdar, above n 10, at 475–476.  
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in perspectives. Those holding such a core moral belief, be it for religious42 or 
secular43 reasons, are unlikely to be swayed by any form of contrary argument. 
  
In contrast, while proponents of aid in dying do not deny that society generally 
should affirm and protect the value of human life, we think this position ought to 
be qualified in respect of (at least) relevant persons. For such individuals, the 
best medical advice is that their medical condition will kill them in the very near 
future. As such, they are not really choosing to end their lives through aid in 
dying, but rather how and when their death will occur. And as Eugene Debs 
poetically expressed the matter a century ago:44 
 
Human life is sacred, but only to the extent that it contributes to the joy and happiness of 
the one possessing it, and to those about him, and it ought to be the privilege of every 
human being to cross the River Styx in the boat of his own choosing, when further human 
agony cannot be justified by the hope of future health and happiness.  
 
So proponents of aid in dying do not claim that society should treat the general 
phenomena of suicide, much less the active euthanasia of incompetent persons, 
as morally neutral matters. Both our laws and our general societal attitudes 
should remain opposed to these practices, just as they should continue to 
prohibit activities such as voluntary human sacrifice to Nordic gods. But 
proponents of aid in dying believe a general commitment to life’s value ought not 
to harden into a duty on all people to continue to live, no matter their individual 
circumstances. In particular, we endorse the observations of Collins J in his 
judgment in Seales v Attorney-General:45   
 
… the consequences of the law against assisting suicide as it currently stands are 
extremely distressing for Ms Seales and … she is suffering because that law does not 
accommodate her right to dignity and personal autonomy.  
 
Our view is that it is morally wrong to for the law to require that (at least) 
relevant persons must experience further distress and suffering. Valorising the 
importance of human life at such a cost is inhumane, involving the improper 
application of rigid principle over basic human compassion. And we ought not to 
treat the harm done to relevant persons as merely the sad but necessary 
collateral damage of our unrelenting moral convictions. Rather, we should 
change our laws to avoid it. 
 
B. The Prohibition on Aid in Dying Is Unnecessarily Cruel 
 
For some relevant persons, the process of dying is not particularly pleasant to 
contemplate. It can be extended, be painful and strip a person of the 
                                                          
42 See, e.g., John Sutherland Bonnell “The Sanctity of Human Life” (1951) 8 Theology Today 194 
at 201; Sacred Congregation on the Doctrine of the Faith Declaration on Euthanasia (5 May 
1980).  
43 See, e.g., Immanuel Kant Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (Hackett, Indianapolis, 
1993) at 422; Neil M Gorsuch The Future of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton (NJ), 2006) at 159.  
44 Quoted in V Robinson “A symposium on euthanasia” (1913) 19 Med Rev of Reviews 143. 
45 Seales, above n 10, at [192]. 
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independence and dignity to which she is accustomed. Take, as an example, the 
irreversible progression of Motor Neuron Disease (MND), which annually claims 
some 100 lives in New Zealand:46 
 
… eventually individuals will not be able to stand or walk, get in or out of bed on their own, 
or use their hands and arms. Difficulty swallowing and chewing impair the person’s ability 
to eat normally and increase the risk of choking. Maintaining weight will then become a 
problem. Because cognitive abilities are relatively intact, people are aware of their 
progressive loss of function and may become anxious and depressed. … In later stages of 
the disease, individuals have difficulty breathing as the muscles of the respiratory system 
weaken. They eventually lose the ability to breathe on their own and must depend on 
ventilatory support for survival.  
 
It is easy to urge those suffering such end stage symptoms to follow Dylan 
Thomas’ injunction to “rage, rage against the dying of the light.” Undoubtedly 
some MND suffers find it within themselves to do so or, alternatively, make their 
peace with their situation and calmly resign themselves to their fate. But for 
others the promise of months of slow wasting away until finally their body ceases 
to function is an utterly horrifying prospect that they would rather avoid by way 
of a swift and painless end. Similarly, other relevant persons facing comparably 
bleak end of life circumstances also may wish to receive aid in dying rather than 
continue to suffer the inescapable effects of their particular condition. Lecretia 
Seales, when unsuccessfully seeking a declaration that aid in dying is permitted 
under New Zealand law, expressed the matter thus:47 
 
I have lived my life as a fiercely independent and active person. I have always been very 
intellectually engaged with the world and my work. For me a slow and undignified death 
that does not reflect the life that I have led would be a terrible way for my good life to 
have to end.  
 
I want to be able to die with a sense of who I am and with a dignity and independence 
that represents the way I have always lived my life. I desperately want to be respected in 
my wish not to have to suffer unnecessarily at the end. I really want to be able to say 
goodbye well.  
 
For proponents of aid in dying, using the criminal law to deny relevant persons 
such a final outcome is unnecessarily cruel. 
 
Of course, we do not label as “cruel” every societal denial of choice that results in 
individual suffering. Laws prohibiting sexual contact with minors likely create 
significant mental anguish for pedophiles, but we would not say that they are 
treated cruelly as a result. Equally, it is not cruel for Pharmac to decide against 
paying for some new medication that can cure a medical condition because the 
organisation’s limited funding can better be used buying drugs that relieve the 
affliction of a greater number of others. In such cases the suffering caused by 
the legal rule or policy choice is outweighed by some demonstrably greater social 
good. However, it is cruel to tell relevant persons that they must continue to live 
in pain and anguish against their will for no good reason. In the rest of this 
                                                          
46 National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke “Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) 
Fact Sheet” (2016) <www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/amyotrophiclateralsclerosis/detail_ALS.htm>. 
47 Seales, above n 7, at [29]. 
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section I consider two arguments to the effect that the law’s prohibition on aid in 
dying does not actually mean that relevant persons must suffer at the end of 
their lives. The rest of this article then contends that such suffering is 
unnecessarily cruel because it is imposed without good reasons for doing so.  
 
(i) Current Laws Do Not Provide Sufficient End of Life Choice 
 
It may be argued that laws permitting aid in dying are unnecessary because 
relevant persons already can take steps to end their lives without having to 
involve any other person.48 As Professor Ahdar notes, the Crimes Act no longer 
makes it an offence to attempt or succeed at committing suicide, and so “[it] is a 
viable option, even for the elderly and enfeebled in all but the most rare 
instances of physical incapacity”. 49  Cashed out fully, that argument must go 
something as follows. There is no need to change our criminal law to enable 
relevant persons to receive a lethal dose of medicine from a doctor at a time of 
their own choosing while surrounded by their loved ones, because such 
individuals instead can go off on their own and cut their wrists, overdose on 
paracetamol or jump in front of a train. I do not regard this as an overly 
compelling claim, for the following reasons. 
 
First, it elides a relevant person’s end of life choice with “committing suicide”. 
And while our law presently does not outright prohibit suicide, it also does not 
positively permit it.50 The Crimes Act 1961, s 41 provides a general defence for 
anyone who uses “such force as may be reasonably necessary in order to 
prevent the commission of suicide … or in order to prevent any act being done 
which he or she believes, on reasonable grounds, would, if committed, amount to 
suicide”. So current law does not say that relevant persons have a right to 
actively end their own lives; rather, it says that anyone who wants to can actively 
stop a relevant person from doing so.51 The real world consequences of this legal 
situation recently became apparent when the police served a number of search 
warrants on elderly people in the Wellington and Nelson regions as well as set up 
a breath alcohol checkpoint to gather information about those who might be 
considering an exercise of end-of-life choice.52 Far from leaving relevant persons 
free to end their own lives through suicide, our present criminal law aggressively 
seeks to prevent this in both theory and practice.  
 
Second, there are important practical differences between how life ends with aid 
in dying and through suicide. Aid in dying involves a doctor providing, or directly 
administering, a fatal cocktail of medicines that render a person unconscious 
before death peacefully occurs. However, it is unlawful to possess such 
medicines unless prescribed by health professionals, meaning that without legal 
access to aid in dying a relevant person must turn to other methods. These 
                                                          
48 Ahdar, above n 10, at 470–471. 
49 At 471. 
50 A point Professor Ahdar recognises at 472–473. 
51 See Colin Gavaghan “Stopping Suicide After Seales” [2016] NZCLR 4. 
52  See Andrew Geddis “Sing me to sleep” (27 October 2016) Pundit 
<http://pundit.co.nz/content/sing-me-to-sleep>. 
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methods are messy and potentially painful in themselves, with someone then 
required to cut down the resultant hanging corpse, clean up the shotgun splatter 
or deal with the train driver’s emotional trauma. Furthermore, such methods run 
a significant risk of failure, which can leave the individual in a worse state than 
they were in before. Simply put, a cancer sufferer with end stage symptoms who 
takes an overdose of paracetamol has a non-zero risk of awakening in a hospital 
bed with not only their cancer symptoms but liver or kidney failure as well. 
 
Finally, the current law on aiding and abetting suicide means that relevant 
persons cannot safely involve anyone else in their end of life choice. This has two 
consequences. It means that a person may feel compelled to end their life at a 
point earlier than they otherwise would, for fear that their deteriorating condition 
will leave them physically unable to do so later on. This claim is not purely 
speculative. Extensive evidence that it occurs was presented to the High Court in 
Seales v Attorney-General,53 with Collins J expressly accepting that “the offence 
provisions of the Crimes Act … may have the effect of forcing Ms Seales to take 
her own life prematurely, for fear that she will be incapable of doing so when her 
condition deteriorates further.”54 In such cases, the failure to permit aid in dying 
effectively robs an individual of a quantum of their life; they die earlier than 
otherwise would be the case. The second consequence is that a relevant person 
necessarily must end her life alone. The mere presence of anyone else in the 
room when death occurs opens that person up to investigation and possible 
subsequent prosecution by the police. By contrast, where aid in dying is 
permitted, relevant persons can surround themselves with family and friends, 
recount memories and say goodbyes before taking the medication that will end 
their life.55 Only the most hard-hearted, it seems to me, could consider that these 
two circumstances are readily interchangeable. 
 
(ii) Palliative Care Is Not a Sufficient Alternative to Aid in Dying 
 
A second argument against the claim that prohibiting aid in dying is unnecessarily 
cruel is that good and proper palliative care can provide a sufficient guarantee 
against the end of life experience of pain.56 The problem with this assertion is 
that it is deeply contested at best, simply not true at worst and in any case 
misdirected. As Collins J concluded from the voluminous evidence presented in 
Seales v Attorney-General, existing palliative care could not guarantee Ms Seales 
would not suffer pain during the dying process,57 while “many of the experts, 
including those relied upon by the Attorney-General accept that palliative care 
                                                          
53 Seales, above n 7, at [51]–[52]. See also R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38, 
[2014] 3 WLR 200 at [96] (per Lord Neuberger); Carter v Canada (Attorney-General) [2015] SCC 
5, [2015] 1 SCR 331 at [15]. 
54 Seales, above n 7, at [166]. See also Carter v Canada, above n 53, at [57]. 
55 For an account of such an ending under California’s aid in dying law, see Lindsey Bever “A 
terminally ill woman had one rule at her end-of-life party: No crying” Washington Post (online ed, 
Washington DC, 16 August 2016). 
56 Ahdar, above n 10, at 497–500. 
57 Seales, above n 7, at [37]–[38]. 
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may not be able to address Ms Seales’ psychological and emotional suffering”.58 
This final point is significant, as evidence from the United States indicates that a 
fear of physical pain is less important to those who choose aid in dying than is a 
desire to retain control over their end of life situation.59 So although the provision 
of aid in dying should never be regarded as a replacement for good palliative 
care, the High Court’s factual finding is that current practices are unable to 
provide a general guarantee of a peaceful, painless, dignified ending for all. 
 
A refinement of this argument is that while current forms of palliative care may 
be unable to provide such guarantees, a properly funded and universally 
available system of care could do so. Therefore, rather than permit aid in dying, 
societal efforts and resources ought to be spent on improving and expanding 
existing arrangements. Of course, that argument treats the availability of aid in 
dying and improved palliative care as necessarily incompatible choices, rather 
than twin policy goals that can be pursued together. I simply note here that 
there is no evidence that this is the case. As two opponents of aid in dying 
admit:60 
 
In 2011, the [European Association for Palliative Care] published a report on palliative care 
development in countries with a euthanasia law. The report highlighted that there has been 
substantial development in palliative care services in these countries, and that it was not 
possible to conclude that the development of palliative care had either been hindered or 
promoted by the legalization of elective death options. 
 
More broadly, suggestions that a universally available and properly funded future 
system of palliative care will be able to sufficiently alleviate end-of-life suffering 
in all cases display a remarkably hubristic view of what medical practice can 
deliver. It also seems strange to argue it is necessary to criminalise a practice 
because there purportedly are superior alternatives for people to choose instead. 
Or, rather, if palliative care really can deliver all that is claimed for it, why is it 
thought that anyone would instead want to avail herself of aid in dying? Because 
                                                          
58 At [44]. 
59 In Oregon, 91.6% of individuals who received aid in dying between 1998-2015 cited “losing 
autonomy” as a reason for doing so, compared to 25.2% who cited “inadequate pain control or 
fear of it”. See Oregon Death With Dignity Act: 2015 Data Summary (Oregon Public Health 
Division, 4 February 2016) at 6. This report is available at: 
<https://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignit
yAct/Documents/year18.pdf>. In Washington state, 87% of individuals who received aid in dying 
in 2014-2015 cited “losing autonomy” as a reason for doing so, compared to 37% who cited 
“inadequate pain control or fear of it”. See Washington State Department of Health 2015 Death 
with Dignity Act Report Executive Summary (Washington State Department of Health, 2016) at 7. 
This report is available at: <www.doh.wa.gov/portals/1/Documents/Pubs/422-109-
DeathWithDignityAct2015.pdf>. 
60 Lars Johan Materstvedt and Georg Bosshard “Euthanasia and Palliative Care” in Nathan Cherny 
et al (eds) Oxford Textbook of Palliative Medicine (5th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) 
at 318. See also Kenneth Chambaere and Jan L Bernheim “Does legal physician-assisted dying 
impede development of palliative care? The Belgian and Benelux experience” (2015) 41 J Med 
Ethics 657 at 660; Bryn Nelson and Terence J Colgan “In debating the right to die, a shift in tone 
among physicians: As laws legalizing physician-assisted suicide gain ground in Canada and 
elsewhere, physicians readjust their stance to retain a say” (2015) 123 Cancer Cytopathology 
327. 
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if even a handful of individuals would rather a quick end to their existence than a 
lingering one protected by the best care that palliative medicine may provide, it is 
cruel to deny that preference for no other reason than that we think it the 
“wrong” one to hold. Consequently, while improved palliative care ought to be a 
societal goal irrespective of any arguments about aid in dying, even the promise 
of such enhanced care does not nullify the arguments that without full end of life 
choice some individuals will continue to suffer in an unnecessarily cruel manner.   
III. AID IN DYING IS CONSISTENT WITH CURRENT END OF LIFE PRACTICES 
This article argues for amending our law to permit a particular form of end of life 
choice: assisted or facilitated aid in dying, which involves a doctor’s voluntary but 
active participation in her patient’s decision. As such, it is not solely an exercise 
of a relevant person’s individual autonomy in that it necessarily involves another 
person in the process. Such involvement, while a matter of conscience for 
individual doctors, nevertheless would represent a change in what currently is 
permitted in the doctor-patient relationship. Opponents of aid in dying view this 
development as “cross[ing] a fundamental legal and ethical Rubicon”, 
representing “a change of monumental proportions both in the law and in the 
role of doctors”.61 In this section I argue that this claim misrepresents the nature 
of the proposed law reform. The provision of aid in dying actually is quite 
consistent with the sorts of choices currently available to a patient at the end of 
her life. And while it would represent an extension of current practices, that 
extension poses no unmanageable new risks or challenges, while entirely fitting 
the modern doctor-patient relationship.  
 
A. The Range of Existing End of Life Choices 
 
At present, our law recognises patient autonomy by allowing a competent adult 
person to choose to die in a variety of ways.62 Section 11 of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990 affirms the right to decline any form of treatment without 
having to provide a reason. Such refusals must be respected even if the 
treatment would be effective in prolonging life:63  
 
A person with operable cancer, for instance, who is able to make a decision on what should 
happen is quite entitled to reject surgery and accept the consequences of not undergoing 
it, even though on an objective view the surgery would improve the quality of the patient’s 
life, if not extend or save it. 
 
Neither is the right to decline treatment restricted to what is sometimes called 
“extraordinary” or “heroic” treatment. Even the provision of food and hydration 
may be refused,64 leading to death by starvation or dehydration. In order to 
relieve the end of life symptoms of a patient who refuses food or hydration, 
                                                          
61 Justin Welby “Why I believe assisting people to die would dehumanise our society for ever” The 
Guardian (online ed, London, 5 September 2015). 
62 See generally Peter Skegg “Medical Acts Hastening Death” in Peter Skegg and Ron Paterson 
(eds), Health Law in New Zealand (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2015) at 623. 
63 Re K (2002) 22 FRNZ 349 (FC) at 356. 
64 Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v All Means All [2014] NZHC 1433. 
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“palliative sedation” — the application of increasing amounts of analgesics and 
sedatives to render the patient unconscious — may take place until death occurs. 
A patient also may insist that life-prolonging interventions be stopped:65  
 
It has been held overseas, and would accord with my thinking, that [the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act 1990, s 11] enables a patient, properly informed, to require life support 
systems to be discontinued. 
 
Finally, a patient may be indirectly euthanised by the provision of life-shortening 
medication under the doctrine of double effect:66 
 
… if [a] doctor were to administer a lethal dose of pain relief such as morphine to [a 
patient], the doctor’s actions may not be an unlawful act within the meaning of s 160(2)(a) 
of the Crimes Act if the doctor’s intention was to provide [the patient] with palliative relief, 
and provided that what was done was reasonable and proper for that purpose, even 
though [the patient’s] life would be shortened as an indirect but foreseeable consequence.    
 
In addition, a number of life-ending choices may be made for patients who are 
not presently competent to express an autonomous choice. A patient may make 
an anticipatory refusal of treatment by means of an advance directive.67 Medical 
staff also may elect to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging treatment on behalf 
of an incompetent patient if they believe that such treatment would not be in the 
patient’s best interests.  The High Court has, for example, permitted the removal 
of ventilatory support from a patient who, while still believed to be aware, was 
“unable to communicate by even elementary means”, 68  and similar decisions 
have been reached by UK courts.69 Against this background, the law’s current 
failure to permit relevant persons to receive aid in dying is deeply anomolous. 
The question then is whether there are any morally relevant reasons to 
distinguish between the broad autonomy accorded to patients when refusing any 
further life sustaining treatment or interventions and the complete denial of such 
autonomy when it comes to requesting active forms of aid in dying.   
 
B. Alleged Problems of Consent and Competence Already Exist  
 
It commonly is claimed that difficulties in determining the competence of a 
relevant person making a request for aid in dying undermines the autonomy 
argument for permitting it. How can we be sure she “really” wants to end her 
suffering by dying? 70  Alternatively, might not a relevant person’s ostensibly 
                                                          
65 Auckland Area Health Board, above n 14, at 245.  
66 Seales, above n 7, at [106]. 
67 Health and Disability Commissioner (Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights) 
Regulations 1996, reg 2, Right 7(5). 
68 Auckland Area Health Board, above n 14, at 238. See also Re G [1997] 2 NZLR 201 (HC); 
Auckland Healthcare Services Ltd v L (1998) 5 HRNZ 748 (HC). 
69 For example, Re AK (Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129 (Fam). 
70 See, e.g., Affidavit of Baroness IG Finlay, 6 May 2015 at [34] (“To end your life is the biggest 
decision that you could make and is cognitively demanding. But detecting cognitive impairment is 
very difficult.”). This affidavit is available at: <http://lecretia.org/wp-
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voluntary decision really be the result of pressure from others, whether direct or 
inferred? For example, members of the UK Supreme Court expressed a:71 
 
… direct concern about weak and vulnerable people in the same unhappy position as 
Applicants, who do not have the requisite desire (namely “a voluntary, clear, settled and 
informed decision to commit suicide”), but who either feel that they have some sort of duty 
to die, or are made to feel (whether intentionally or not) that they have such a duty by 
family members or others, because their lives are valueless and represent an unjustifiable 
burden on others.  
 
While such concerns are valid, they fail to offer credible reasons to distinguish aid 
in dying from the withdrawal of life-preserving treatment or interventions. For all 
the risks and perils often suggested to accompany aid in dying already arise in 
the context of existing end of life choices. In particular, the dangers of 
vulnerability, incapacity, coercion and misinformation are all present in the sorts 
of routine decisions that doctors and nurses caring for dying patients currently 
must take. Those decisions necessitate a determination of competence and 
consent,72 and it is not apparent why such a determination would be less reliable 
in the aid in dying context than in the context where a patient refuses dialysis 
treatment, food and hydration or a blood transfusion. The difficulty of making 
such determinations is not then thought to provide an ethical basis for a blanket 
ban on all life-ending decisions; on the contrary, healthcare professionals are 
routinely trusted with them.  
 
A recent English Court of Protection case provides an illustration of the approach 
taken by courts to the question of end of life competence in common law 
jurisdictions. 73  Following an attempt at suicide that destroyed her kidney 
function, the patient (“C”) sought to refuse life-saving dialysis in spite of medical 
advice that she could expect to live for a significant further period with it. C’s 
reasons for refusal included:74 
 
… that she believed she may need dialysis for the rest of her life, saw a bleak future if she 
could not have a life of socialising, drinking and partying with friends, that getting old 
scared her both in terms of illness and appearance.   
 
The Court’s consideration of these reasons is illustrative of the approach taken to 
treatment refusals more generally:75 
 
The decision C has reached to refuse dialysis can be characterised as an unwise one. That 
C considers that the prospect of growing old, the fear of living with fewer material 
possessions and the fear that she has lost, and will not regain, ‘her sparkle’ outweighs a 
prognosis that signals continued life will alarm and possibly horrify many … C’s decision is 
certainly one that does not accord with the expectations of many in society. Indeed, others 
in society may consider C’s decision to be unreasonable, illogical or even immoral within 
the context of the sanctity accorded to life by society in general. None of this however is 
                                                          
71  R (Nicklinson), above n 53, at [86] (per Lord Neuberger). See also at [228] (per Lord 
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72 Sainsbury, above n 11, at 107–108. 
73 Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v C [2015] EWCOP 80. 
74 At [74].  
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evidence of a lack of capacity. … As a capacitous individual C is, in respect of her own body 
and mind, sovereign.   
 
There is no real doubt that such a patient would be deemed competent to make 
the same choice in New Zealand. That people may make unwise, idiosyncratic or 
morally questionable decisions about the value of their lives is not presently 
accepted as a reason to deny them control over life and death decisions. 76 
Neither is the fact that capacity assessments are not infallible.  
 
Concerns that relevant persons may seek aid in dying on the basis of a perceived 
“duty to die” also are not really new. After all, we respect the decision of a 
Jehovah’s Witness who tells a doctor she refuses consent to a life-saving blood 
transfusion because she does not wish to betray the religious beliefs she shares 
with her family and wider congregation. But if a perceived duty to die is believed 
to fatally undermine an individual’s decisional capacity, why should a doctor 
refrain from providing treatment in this situation? Equally, we valourise the so-
called “altruistic suicides” of individuals like Captain Oates, who actively end their 
lives in order to benefit others. Such behaviour is seen as the epitome of Christ’s 
injunction that “Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life 
for his friends.” 77  It seems odd, then, to conclude that a relevant person’s 
concern about how her condition may impact on the lives of her loved ones 
automatically vitiates their autonomy, such that we cannot trust the basis of their 
end of life decisions. Or, rather, if such other-regarding concerns do have this 
effect, not only does our understanding of capacity in wider end of life situations 
need revisiting but also our very understanding of what is noble and 
praiseworthy is flawed. 
 
Therefore, insofar as the mechanisms we currently possess are deemed 
adequate to distinguish competent from incompetent treatment or intervention 
refusals, there is no reason why they would be inadequate to distinguish 
competent from incompetent requests for aid in dying. Insofar as aid in dying 
poses risks, they are risks that already exist in our end of life decision-making 
practices. And so if those risks are considered by opponents of aid in dying to be 
intolerable in respect of that practice, then it is incumbent on such opponents to 
explain why they are not presently resulting in widespread errors or abuses in 
current end of life situations. Furthermore, it is important to note that current 
legislative proposals to permit aid in dying in New Zealand would impose far 
more rigorous safeguards than exist under current medical practice. Before 
permitting a relevant person to receive aid in dying, David Seymour’s End of Life 
Choice Bill would require a minimum seven day waiting period;78 the certifying 
medical practitioner to encourage the applicant to consult with his or her family 
or a close friend about the request, and seek professional counselling;79  the 
mandatory agreement of a second practitioner;80 and scrutiny by the Registrar.81 
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Louisa Wall’s draft Authorised Dying Bill proposes an even more extensive 
authorisation procedure, requiring a specially constituted ethics committee to 
review and assent to any individual request for aid in dying. 82  With such 
mechanisms in place, we can be far more certain that any successful request for 
aid in dying represents a genuinely consented, non-coerced choice than we can 
with regard to already permitted patient demands to discontinue life sustaining 
treatment or refuse further medical procedures.  
 
C. The Act Versus Omission Distinction Is Illusory  
 
Another attempt to distinguish current end of life choices from the provision of 
aid in dying is through contrasting actions with omissions to act.83 On this view, it 
is morally permissible  indeed, morally required  for a doctor to refrain from 
treatment or intervention where a competent adult patient demands this, even if 
death results. However, it is not ever morally permissible for a doctor to actively 
and intentionally cause her patient’s death, even if requested to do so by a 
competent adult. The patient’s autonomy right thus forms a negative shield from 
unwanted interference, rather than a positive ground for obtaining aid from 
another.84 Equally, the doctor’s forbearance from acting is said simply to allow 
the patient’s condition to take its “natural” course, whereas the provision of aid in 
dying operates as the immediate cause of death.  Thus, there is a relevant moral 
distinction to be drawn between letting someone die and killing her.   
 
The moral significance of this act-versus-omission distinction has been subject to 
extensive criticism over many years. For as James Rachels notes: “There is 
nothing wrong with being the cause of someone’s death if his death is, all things 
considered, a good thing. And if his death is not a good thing, then no form of 
euthanasia, active or passive, is justified.”85 Furthermore, it simply is not true 
that current end of life practices require only forbearance on the part of health 
professionals. For example, a patient’s request for the discontinuance of 
respiratory assistance involves a doctor physically removing a breathing tube 
from the patient’s throat. The disabling of a cardiac implantable electronic device 
requires the positive step of reprogramming its operation, or even operating to 
remove it altogether. And so on. While the law then treats such procedures as 
being an “omission” for the purpose of avoiding criminal liability on the doctor’s 
part, this is a legal fiction designed to enable what we regard as morally 
desirable practices to occur.86 We know that this is the case because the exact 
same conduct carried out by another  say, the removal of a breathing tube by 
a greedy relative anxious to inherit a patient’s wealth  would be deemed an 
                                                                                                                                                                             
81 At cl 24. 
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“act” to which criminal liability attaches.87 The act versus omission distinction 
thus ultimately rests on a judgment reached on quite separate moral grounds as 
to whether the behaviour in question should be allowed, rather than anything 
intrinsic to the nature of that behaviour itself.  
 
The distinction is then completely elided in respect of indirect euthanasia, where 
the double effect doctrine is invoked. This practice involves a doctor giving 
increasing doses of opioids to a terminally ill patient for the purposes of relieving 
her pain, while knowing that doing so could depress the patient’s respiratory 
system and so hasten death. In Seales v Attorney-General it was accepted that 
such practices constitute an act causing death, but Collins J also opined that “the 
doctor’s actions may not be an unlawful act”88 as the primary purpose is the 
relief of suffering. A narrow and a broad point can be made here. First, under 
this analysis there is a strong argument that facilitated aid in dying likewise 
should not be viewed as an unlawful act. 89  For why can the double effect 
doctrine not extend to a doctor who provides a patient with a dose of fatal 
medication without intending that the patient actually use this to end her life, but 
rather wanting only to relieve the suffering caused by the patient’s lost sense of 
control in their end of life situation?90 The broader point is that the practice of 
palliative sedation fatally undermines any claim that our law ought to strictly 
uphold the sanctity of life. It patently does not do so. Rather, it condones the 
positive actions of doctors who cause the death of their patients, so long as their 
primary intention is deemed to be the easing of suffering rather than a desire to 
end their patients’ lives. But as the easing of suffering is precisely what a 
relevant person seeks through aid in dying, the distinction in intention becomes 
morally irrelevant. For how is a doctor who knows her actions in relieving 
suffering will bring about the end of a relevant person’s life any different to a 
doctor who brings about the end of a relevant person’s life knowing this will 
relieve that person’s suffering? 
 
D. Providing Aid in Dying Is Consistent with Medical Ethics 
 
Although I have argued above that aid in dying cannot meaningfully be 
distinguished from existing forms of end of life choice, it must be acknowledged 
that a current majority of the medical community does not appear to agree. The 
professional associations representing New Zealand’s doctors and nurses are 
united in opposing a law change to permit aid in dying, while international 
medical associations express similar views at the global level. This view is that 
intentionally causing a patient’s death, even the death of a relevant person, is 
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fundamentally inconsistent with a health professional’s ethical role.91 However, 
there is reason to believe that this apparently implacable opposition is less solidly 
grounded than surface appearances suggest. 
 
We may begin by noting that medical ethics are not a set of fixed and 
unchanging edicts written in tablets of stone. Take the original Oath of 
Hippocrates, often cited as the basis for the idea of medicine as a moral 
community.92 Although it required of its taker that “I will neither give a deadly 
drug to anybody who asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect”, it 
also committed him “to teach [medicine to others] — if they desire to learn it — 
without fee and covenant”, whilst stating “I will not give to a woman an abortive 
remedy”. The apparent ethical obligation to provide free teaching is something 
current debt-stricken medical students may be surprised to discover, whilst the 
injunction against performing an abortion is now treated as a matter of 
conscience for individual practitioners. By the same token, currently routine end 
of life practices were themselves deeply controversial only a matter of decades 
ago. Although the right of competent patients to refuse life prolonging medical 
treatment and interventions is now treated as absolute, it once was the subject 
of serious legal and ethical debate.93 However, over time doctors first accepted 
the withdrawal of respirators from patients in persistent vegetative states; then it 
became acceptable to stop any kind of medical intervention, including artificial 
nutrition and hydration, from patients in any condition. The once untenable 
became ethically unremarkable. 
 
Furthermore, the (largely) 94  unified views of professional bodies mask real 
differences of opinion and even practice amongst individual members of the 
profession. 95  While I have until now focused on relevant persons’ autonomy 
interests, the prohibition on aid in dying also impacts upon those providing end 
of life care. As Glanville Williams noted some 50 years ago:96 
 
It is the doctor’s responsibility to do all he can to prolong worth-while life, or, in the last 
resort, to ease his patient’s passage. If the doctor honestly and sincerely believes that the 
best service he can perform for his suffering patient is to accede to his request for 
euthanasia, it is a grave thing that the law should forbid him to do so. 
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Although such doctors may at present form a minority of the profession both in 
New Zealand and globally, they are by no means an insignificant segment of it. 
Indeed, in some areas of practice they may well now be in the majority. I have 
outlined above the end stage effects of MND. Having repeatedly seen these 
circumstances first hand, a recent survey of 231 Canadian MND doctors and 
allied health providers reported that some 80 percent believe patients with 
moderate to severe symptoms should be eligible to seek aid in dying, with only 8 
percent not supporting its availability at any stage of the disease.97 In regards 
this particular condition at least, it may be the opponents of aid in dying who are 
in the minority of medical opinion. 
 
Opponents then have to fall back on general claims that allowing aid in dying 
even in patient-doctor relationships where both parties accept it is in a relevant 
person’s best interests will create negative consequences for the wider practice 
of medicine. John Finnis, for instance, warns that aid in dying risks undermining 
“patient trust” in doctors or creating a “change in heart” in medical 
practitioners.98 However, the limited evidence that has been gathered on such 
claims fails to substantiate them.99 For at its core, medical opposition to aid in 
dying really seems driven by an underlying, somewhat conservative 
understanding of the practice of medicine:100 
 
… the [traditional] professional ideal of the physician-patient relationship held that the 
physician directed care and made decisions about treatment; the patient’s principal role 
was to comply with ‘doctor’s orders.’ … When faced with what appeared to be a patient’s 
irrational choices or preferences, physicians were encouraged by this approach to overlook 
or override them as not being in the patient’s true interests. 
 
Such a model of medical care is now quite out of step with all other aspects of 
the modern patient-doctor relationship. Or, as one US doctor puts it:101 
 
We always listen to the patient. We never tell a patient: “This is what you have to do. You 
have no choice.” Yet at the moment when their life is ending—when they say, “I don’t 
want to live in this bed for the next three weeks waiting to die”—it’s an odd change in the 
consent procedure. Suddenly they become wrong and we become right. That does not 
make sense to me. Dying should not be completely separate from everything else we do in 
medicine.  
 
                                                          
97 Agessandro Abrahao et al “Physician-assisted death: A Canada-wide survey of ALS health care 
providers” (2016) 87 Neurology 1152. See also M Maessen “Euthanasia and physician-assisted 
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98 John Finnis The Collected Essays of John Finnis, Vol 3, Human Rights and Common Good 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 260. 
99 See, e.g., M Hall, F Trachtenberg and E Dugan “The impact on patient trust of legalising 
physician aid in dying” (2005) 31 J Med Ethics 693; Anna Lindblad, Rurik Löfmark and Niels Lynöe 
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Proponents of aid in dying concur with this view. The provision of aid in dying 
should not be seen as inconsistent with the role of a doctor. It is, rather, 
something that can be accommodated within the physician’s role without 
undermining the ethical obligation to care for her patients’ welfare and interests. 
 
IV. ON LINE DRAWING AND SLIPPERY SLOPES 
 
Beyond objections to aid in dying in principle, there are two commonly made 
practical objections to its adoption in any form. The first relates to deciding who 
should be able to access it and the problems associated with distinguishing those 
who can do so from those who cannot. It is argued that if aid in dying 
proponents are true to their principles, they cannot limit the scope of aid in dying 
to relevant persons alone. The second objection relates to potential future effects 
of adopting even the most limited form of aid in dying. Opponents claim that 
even if it were possible to create a restricted form of aid in dying that does not 
threaten to harm vulnerable individuals (which they in any case deny),102 that 
model will over time move in an ever more liberal direction. As it does so and aid 
in dying is practiced in a commonplace fashion, pressure on the elderly, disabled 
and the otherwise “burdensome” to avail themselves of the option will intensify. 
In this section I address and rebut both of these claims. 
 
A. On Line Drawing 
 
This article has argued that relevant persons – that is, those suffering unbearably 
as the result of an incurable and terminal medical condition where death is 
predicted to occur in the next six months – ought to be permitted access to aid in 
dying provided by a willing doctor. As noted in its introduction, if the argument is 
to be successful for anyone, then it will be for this class of persons. Conversely, if 
the argument is not successful for this class of persons, then it will not be for 
anyone. However, it may be objected that limiting the argument in this way 
artificially draws the circle too narrowly. For why should persons suffering from 
non-terminal but untreatable medical conditions be prevented from accessing aid 
in dying? Surely their autonomy claim also ought to be respected in that it is 
even crueler to force them to live in pain and anguish for an indeterminate future 
length of time? Indeed, it may be argued that if individual autonomy is regarded 
as so vital, why are any limits be placed on it at all?103 To return to the case of 
“C” discussed earlier, why should a person who rejects the “prospect of growing 
old, the fear of living with fewer material possessions and the fear that she has 
lost, and will not regain, ‘her sparkle’” be barred from receiving a doctor’s aid to 
end her life?  
 
The short answer to this challenge is to admit that any proponent of aid in dying 
who does not advocate a general right to assisted suicide for everyone inevitably 
must engage in a line drawing exercise. The reason for doing so is recognition 
that human life has an inherent value such that not every reason for seeking to 
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end it should be accorded the same respect. And amongst those who believe that 
ending some forms of human suffering ought to outweigh “the sanctity of life” 
there will be disagreements over who ought to qualify to receive aid in dying. I 
have argued the minimal case here: that relevant persons at least should be 
permitted to access aid in dying. In contrast, David Seymour’s Bill would permit 
individuals suffering “a grievous and irremediable medical condition” to access 
aid in dying,104 whilst Louisa Wall’s alternative proposal restricts access to aid in 
dying to suffering persons whose death is predicted within 12 months. There is 
thus a degree of potential arbitrariness involved in any decision on qualifying 
criteria, for a person prohibited from accessing aid in dying under any given 
regulatory regime always may ask “if them, why not me?” 
 
However, the fact that proponents of aid in dying must engage in creating 
disputable and perhaps seemingly arbitrary boundaries does not doom the 
exercise. First of all, a world in which relevant persons at a minimum can access 
aid in dying is more morally just than one in which they are not permitted to do 
so, even if it is not considered optimally just by some. Therefore, society ought 
to respect the right of at least relevant persons to access aid in dying and then 
seriously consider what other groups (if any) should also qualify. Second, the 
problem of line drawing exists for those on both sides of the aid in dying debate. 
For opponents of the proposition either must argue in favour of radically rolling 
back currently accepted medical practices105 or else have to justify why certain 
existing end of life choices (removal of respiratory assistance, palliative sedation, 
refusal of sustenance, etc) are permitted whilst others (assisted or facilitated aid 
in dying) are forbidden. The practical application of currently permitted choices 
then generates its own potential absurdities. For example, a patient with 
advanced cancer who also has a pacemaker fitted may quickly end their suffering 
by requiring that it be deprogrammed, whilst another cancer patient without a 
pacemaker cannot. So at present a person’s right to exercise end of life choice 
under current law depends upon the particular condition that they happen to 
suffer from, just as would be the case if aid in dying were to be permitted for 
some class of persons but not for others.  
 
Finally, problems associated with line drawing are not regarded as a reason for 
outright prohibiting other practices. Take, for example, the case of a girl aged 16 
years and one day who engages in sexual intercourse with a boy aged 15 years 
and 364 days. Current law deems the girl to have committed a crime punishable 
by up to 10 years imprisonment,106 but not the boy. That absurdity may provide 
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a reason to revisit exactly how we regulate the age of consent,107 but no one 
would seriously argue that we should avoid all line drawing problems in this area 
by criminalising anyone who engages in sexual intercourse with anyone else. 
Equally, there is no reason to respond to difficulties in deciding who qualifies to 
access aid in dying by saying that no one at all may do so. Rather, the better 
response is to engage in a serious debate about what we see as being the value 
of life and what particular circumstances so undermine it that an individual ought 
to be able to decide that they no longer wish to experience it. Only that 
conversation can tell us where the right line for our society lies. 
 
B. On Slippery Slopes 
 
This article has argued that New Zealand law should be changed to allow 
competent adult persons to directly request aid in dying where the prognosis of 
their medical condition is death within six months. Consequently, concerns about 
such a law change’s effect on vulnerable groups — children, the elderly, the 
disabled, incompetent persons, etc — are misplaced as they simply would not 
qualify to receive aid in dying. Nevertheless, opponents of such a change argue 
that the law will slip over time in the direction of permitting ever-wider access to 
aid in dying. Such slippage, it then is alleged, will increase the threat that aid in 
dying will pose to vulnerable groups.108 For as it becomes more available and is 
practiced in a commonplace fashion, pressure on the elderly, the disabled and 
the otherwise “burdensome” to avail themselves of the option will intensify.109 
Whatever initial safeguards are adopted will then prove ineffective in protecting 
the vulnerable, as the practice becomes normalised, even expected. Almost 
inevitably, such slippery slope claims are accompanied by reference to 
jurisdictions such as the Netherlands or Belgium and the alleged practices that 
occur under their regulatory regimes.110 
 
One response to this claim is to look at those jurisdictions where aid in dying is 
permitted and note that there is no one global, common practice.111  Different 
countries instead have established quite different regimes that permit different 
classes of individuals to access different methods of aid in dying. As Professor 
Ahdar also recognises, 112  this fact should make us somewhat cautious when 
drawing “lessons” about the practice of aid in dying from any particular 
jurisdiction. We instead would be wise to heed Penney Lewis’ warning:113 
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Slippery slope arguments, whether logical or empirical, often make distinctly unhelpful 
contributions to debates over legalization [of aid in dying]. … Instead, we should learn 
from the experience in jurisdictions which have legalized assisted dying, while recognizing 
that because of different social contexts and baseline rates of covert practices, and the use 
of diverse mechanisms of legal change, those experiences do not translate directly to other 
jurisdictions. 
 
However, what even a cursory examination of overseas jurisdictions does reveal 
is that there are examples both of nations that have over time increased the 
availability of aid in dying and jurisdictions that have remained stable. North 
America exemplifies the latter case. For some 20 years, Oregon has permitted aid 
in dying only for individuals suffering a terminal illness and a prognosis of six 
months to live without changing the qualifying criteria.114 The five US states that 
then have followed in Oregon’s wake all have adopted similarly restrictive 
qualifying criteria, as has Canada when it recently legislated to regulate aid in 
dying. This experience is in direct contradiction to any claim that the introduction 
of aid in dying somehow inevitably results in its application to an ever-widening 
group of individuals. 
 
Admittedly, the Netherlands and Belgium exemplify the opposite trajectory. Both 
countries have, over time, expanded the range of individuals who may access aid 
in dying. However, the particular reasons why they have done so need to be 
understood. Aid in dying first was allowed in the Netherlands from the 1980s as 
the result of judicial rulings that permitted the practice in situations other than 
where an individual is suffering a terminal illness. Consequently, when the 
Netherlands’ Parliament came to enact legislation on the matter, it did so against 
the backdrop of an already existing, comparatively expansive regulatory regime. 
A recent discussion of the development of aid in dying in the Benelux nations 
also points to the particular cultural circumstances that applied in the 
Netherlands:115 
 
… four salient features of the Dutch legal, cultural, and medical systems … have affected 
the debate and attendant legalization of aid in dying in the Netherlands: the notion of 
“legal tolerance” or “forbearance” (gedoogbeleid); the Dutch indisposition toward taboos, 
or their understanding that everything should be freely discussed (bespreekbaarheid); their 
historically unparalleled trust in physicians; and the Dutch ethos of ‘conflict avoidance’. 
 
The Netherlands experience then had a marked impact on its near (and culturally 
quite similar) neighbours. In other words, the Benelux nations form a cluster of 
socially and politically similar societies that have adopted a broadly consistent 
approach to the matter. There is no reason to assume that other nations that do 
not share those social and political similarities will act likewise. Furthermore, in 
both the Netherlands and Belgium it has been the country’s elected legislature — 
following a process of open public deliberation — that has decided to define (and 
then redefine) the criteria that must be met before aid in dying may be accessed. 
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At any point in time, the elected legislature in each of those countries could say 
that it did not wish to make that change. So the fact that the Dutch and/or the 
Belgians have chosen to do so means little in respect of how we here in New 
Zealand might decide to address those matters in the future. 
 
V. IN CONCLUSION – THE PUBLIC GETS WHAT THE PUBLIC WANTS 
 
The conclusion to this article is its shortest and most straightforward part. Aid in 
dying should be introduced into New Zealand because, irrespective of any 
uncertainties or posited risks, the people of the country support it being a part of 
our law. Repeated opinion polls over the last couple of years report a steady 
majority of some 65-75% of respondents support the legalisation of 
“euthanasia”. 116  Perhaps most notably, in 2015 some 15,259 participants in 
Auckland University’s New Zealand Attitudes and Values Survey answered the 
question, “Suppose a person has a painful incurable disease. Do you think that 
doctors should be allowed by law to end the patient’s life if the patient requests 
it?” Using a Likert scale of 1-7,117 the mean response was 5.6, with some 66 per 
cent answering 6-7, 21.7 per cent 3-5 and 12.3 per cent 1-2. 118  The study 
authors then confidently assert, “Because we have such a national representative 
sample of New Zealanders, findings of our study are likely to reflect what the 
general New Zealand public over the age of 18 think about this issue.”119 As 
such, the data demonstrates that New Zealanders not only are comfortable with 
the idea of aid in dying occurring in their society, but also positively want their 
law to allow it to do so. 
 
Opponents of aid in dying then have two standard responses to such indications 
of public opinion. The first is to call into question the meaningfulness of such 
polls, citing problems in the way questions are worded or alleging that 
respondents do not really understand the issues at stake.120 I simply will note the 
consistency of reported views across multiple surveys involving differently 
worded questions and suggest that were the results reversed, concerns about 
methodology or participant understanding likely would vanish. The second 
approach is to deny that aid in dying really is the sort of issue that public opinion 
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ought to decide. Consequently, Professor Ahdar argues, “majority desire alone is 
not the touchstone of public policy”.121 That claim certainly is true; we can all 
think of some proposed law that we would regard as unjust even if a majority of 
the population expressed support for it. However, I have argued that far from 
being unjust, changing the law to permit aid in dying for at least relevant persons 
would be a moral advance for us as a society. It also happens to be a law change 
that a large majority of New Zealanders supports. Therefore, its continuing 
prohibition by way of the criminal law thus reflects the moral qualms of a small 
(and apparently shrinking) subset of society.  
 
And, I would contend, it simply is wrong for our criminal law to privilege those 
minority views at the cost of imposing cruel outcomes on those relevant persons 
who wish to end their lives on their own terms. That is, at its core, the case for 
permitting aid in dying in New Zealand. 
 
 
                                                          
121 At 501 (emphasis in the original). 
